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Returned failed asylum seekers ‘deserve security and protection upon their 
arrival and return, access to legal representation and the support of an 
independent monitoring body committed to discovering the truth.1 
 
The status of the refugee has developed from the beneficiary of a paternalistic 
system of certification to the claimant of rights.2 
 
What happens to failed asylum seekers3 that are removed? Non-refoulement 
has been analysed many times over by academics and judges alike. But the 
fate of returned failed asylum seekers remains an under-researched void 
within the context of forced migration studies. Indeed, it has been ‘recognized 
                                                             
1 B Iyodu ‘Uganda: The silent practise of deportations’ Pambazuka News (6 May 2012). 
2 G Goodwin-Gill ‘Refugee identity and protection’s fading prospect’ Refugee rights and 
realities (Cambridge Press 1999). 
3 ‘Returnees’ are referenced in this paper as failed asylum seekers who have been returned to 
their country of origin following denial of refugee status by the host state. 
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repeatedly as a major gap in the global refugee framework’.4 Many failed 
asylum seekers who have been removed have ‘disappeared’, and there is often 
no way to find out what became of them. Existing knowledge is anecdotal. 
Unsafe Return, a report by the UK-based non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) Justice First, documents several returnees, including a female asylum 
seeker from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), taken to the infamous 
Tolérance Zero prison upon her return, where she was tortured and raped.5 
Such cases should no longer remain anecdotal, but should form part of a body 
of information upon which action can be taken. This paper asserts that this 
can be achieved through a ‘monitoring network’.  
A monitoring network would be comprised of several participating 
organisations in countries of origin. Those managing the monitoring network 
would be alerted to planned returns, and, with the permission of the returnee, 
participating organisations in countries of origin would be notified of their 
return.  Ideally, representatives of the participating organisations would 
monitor the returnees once in their country of origin. This might consist of 
meeting them at the airport, contacting the returnee, or visiting them in 
detention, if necessary. Information regarding the returnee would then feed 
back into the monitoring network. Thus, whilst seeking to build a relevant 
body of Country of Origin Information (COI), the monitoring network would 
also seek to ensure the safety and welfare of returnees once they are returned. 
Such COI could serve to better improve States’ adherence to non-refoulement.6 
This paper is guided by a series of questions. Firstly, what constitutes 
refoulement, and what State obligations exist in terms of avoiding - and 
monitoring cases of - refoulement? This sets the legal backdrop upon which 
the feasibility of a monitoring network can be assessed. Secondly, why is a 
monitoring network needed? Emerging cases of refoulement, increases in 
deportations and inadequate refugee status determination (RSD) procedures 
                                                             
4 Letter from editors of Oxford Forced Migration to co-author of Fahamu Deportation Project 
(9 October 2011). 
5 C Ramos Unsafe Return (Justice First 2011) 27. This returnee was released after paying a 
hefty bribe. 
6 This has been exemplified in cases such as SM and Others, which this thesis will later analyse 












all contribute to this need. Erroneous RSD procedures result in refused 
refugee status and deportation; such individuals are no longer ‘of concern’ to 
the host state nor the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). As this paper explores, such individuals are often deported to 
danger, and should therefore be monitored. Finally, this paper asks what 
monitoring network would look like. How can we ensure it serves its legal 
purpose? And what difficulties would it encounter?  
This paper takes inspirations from the proposed deportation project of the 
Fahamu Refugee Programme (FRP)7 and from experiences working at the 
Legal Resources Centre (LRC) in Cape Town. Many Congolese clients have 
expressed concern at post-return treatment. Some have experienced it, and 
are claiming asylum for the second time. Due to its immediate relevance, this 
paper will use removals from South Africa to DRC as a case study, whilst other 
states, including the UK, are referenced. 
 
2. Non-refoulement as a cornerstone of refugee law 
 
Non-refoulement, as found at Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (Convention), is ‘the undisputed cornerstone of refugee 
law’.8  Article 33 of the Convention states that 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.9 
 
                                                             
7 FRP ‘Deportation of failed asylum seekers’ Fahamu Refugee Project. Available at 
http://frlan.org/content/deportation-failed-asylum-seekers-0. Accessed 22 May 2012. 
8 J Hathaway Refugee rights: report on a comparative study (York Lane Press, 1995) 5. 












International consensus on the principle of non-refoulement has been 
‘systematically reaffirmed’ at UN level,10 and has generally been considered as 
international customary law.11 However, the status of ‘customary law’ is 
questionable as States continue to refoule.12   
Beneficiaries of this provision includes ‘every individual having a well-
founded fear of persecution’,13 regardless of whether they are asylum seekers 
or refugees.14  The protection of non-refoulement also covers those in 
‘international zones’. 15  Furthermore, the provision includes returning 
refugees ‘in any manner whatsoever’, which covers all forms of refoulement, 
including extradition, expulsion and deportation, 16  including to third 
countries where there is a likelihood of further refoulement.17  
A grey area exists regarding the refoulement of primae facie refugees who 
have not yet entered a state’s territory. The Thai government’s return of the 
Vietnamese boat people, or the US government’s decision to send boatfuls of 
unscreened Haitian refugees back to Haiti serve as examples.18 In the US case 
                                                             
10 UNHCR UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement (1997) 1 and Executive 
Committee, Conclusion Number 6 (XXVIII) Conclusions on the international protection of 
refugees adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, 14.  
11 UNHCR, Agenda for Protection (2003) 24 and UNHCR (n7). 
12 A Duffy ‘Expulsion to face torture? Non-refoulement in international law’ International 
Journal of Refugee Law (2008) 20, 3, 377. 
13 Guy Goodwin-Gill The principle of non-refoulement: its standing and scope in international 
law (1993) 2. This is also set in caselaw. For example, Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship; and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32, Australia: High Court, 31 August 2011 clarifies that those seeking 
protection due to a well-founded fear are protected under non-refoulement. Whether primae 
facie refugees are protected by non-refoulement is discussed shortly. 
14 UNHCR Note on the principle of non-refoulement (n10 above) - also confirmed Plaintiff v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (n13 above). 
15 This principle has been set down by several cases, including the South African case of Abdi 
and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2011 (3) SA 37 (SCA), 29. 
16 Goodwin-Gill (n 13 above) 16. 
17 K Wouters International legal standards for the protection from refoulement (Intersentia, 
2009) 140. This is known as ‘indirect refoulement’. Confirmed in caselaw, such as NAGV and 
NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs , (2005) 
HCA 6, Australia: High Court, 2 March 2005. This issue is pertinent to Australia: the case deals 
with states such as Nauru and permitted Australia’s transfer of hundreds of asylum seekers 
for their RSD processing (Human Rights Watch By Invitation Only: Australian Asylum Policy 
(2002) 1). 












Sale v Haitian Centres Council, the Supreme Court held that there was ‘an 
inherent territorial limitation on the prohibition of refoulement contained in 
Article 33(1)’. 19  Hathaway describes the ambiguity of refoulement 
applicability in this context, where the Australian government’s decision to 
turn away the Tampa ship, full of Afghani asylum seekers as having no basis in 
international law. Simultaneously, ‘neither is there a basis in international 
refugee law for the assertion ... that those rescued had a right to come to the 
Australian mainland in order to enter that country’s asylum system’.20  
Differing interpretations also exist amongst refugee law academics. Whilst 
Goodwin-Gill confirms that ‘states...have recognised that non-refoulement 
applies to the moment at which asylum-seekers present themselves for 
entry’, 21  Wouters finds that obligations of non-refoulement evoke State 
obligations of non-rejection at the border.22 Hathaway concludes, after tying 
in the provisions of non-penalisation (Article 31 of the Refugee Convention), 
that ‘a state party is not precluded from ex elling a refugee claimant from its 
territory during the earliest phases of refugee reception. It is only barred from 
doing so mechanistically or without scrupulous regard for the simultaneously 
applicable duty of non-refoulement’ – a conclusion that Hathaway admits is 
‘not universally shared’.23 Space does not permit a deeper discussion of the 
applicability of non-refoulement, save to consider the wide theoretical – yet 
narrow practical – applicability of non-refoulement. 
According to the Refugee Convention, non-refoulement can be over-ridden in 
certain cases: 
The benefit of the present provision [non-refoulement] may not, however, be 
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country.24 
                                                             
19Sale v. Haitian Centres Council, 509 U.S 155 (1993) 1. 
20 J Hathaway ‘Refugee law is not immigration law’ World Refugee Survey 2002 (2002) 41. 
21 Guy Goodwin-Gill The Refugee in International Law: Second Edition (Oxford University 
Press, 1998) 124. 
22 Wouters (n 17 above) 507. 
23 J Hathaway ‘The Rights of Refugees under International Law’ (Cambridge University Press, 
2005) 42. 













Case-law has encouraged a narrow interpretation of this provision. Suresh v 
Canada clarified that perceived threats to national security must ‘be grounded 
on objectively reasonable suspicion... [and] threatened harm must be 
substantial rather than negligible’.25 Regarding public order, the judge of RU 
(Bangladesh) v SSHD, a UK case, set a proportionality test by asking whether 
the appellant’s expulsion would be ‘proportionate to the legitimate public end 
sought to be achieved’.26 However, States continue to interpret this provision 
widely. For example, in 1990, president Moi of Kenya ordered that ‘all 
refugees engaged in illegal activities’ should be deported.27 A similar expulsion 
took place during the 1980s when Rwandans were ‘chased’ from Uganda in an 
outbreak of anti-Rwandan hostility.28 Indeed, Hathaway finds that mass 
expulsions on grounds of public order occur more within the African context 
due to the fear that refugees’ presence may evoke ‘armed conflict or 
retaliatory attack’.29 Such expulsions of refugees further highlights the need 
for such returnees’ monitoring. 
 
Although, as abovementioned, non-refoulement can be over-ridden in some 
cases, the provisions protecting an individual from refoulement in other 
provisions is much wider and, ultimately, non-derogable. The obligations 
derived from the Refugee Convention and the resulting domestic statutes 
should be interpreted to be consistent with other bodies of international law; 
thus, with regards to non-refoulement, the state’s obligations under CAT, 
ICCPR and other international human rights law treaties, ensures further 
protection for any individual facing refoulement.30 Chalal v United Kingdom,31 a 
landmark refoulement case in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
                                                             
25 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002, 90. 
26 RU (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) [2011] EWCA Civ 
651. 
27 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Kenya: information on the current status of 
refugees in Kenya, on their rights and on whether Kenya protects them from non-refoulement 
(forced repatriation) (1993). 
28 Hathaway (n 23 above) 661. 
29 Hathaway (n 23 above) 662. 
30 As stressed by the Canadian refoulement case of Németh v. Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 
56, Canada: Supreme Court, 25 November 2010, 5. The specific protection provided by these 
treaties is discussed in greater detail below. 












involved a Sikh asylum-seeker facing expulsion to India. The appellant was 
alleged, by the UK Home Office, to be a terrorist member of a separatist group. 
It was claimed that the appellant would face persecution on return. The Court 
held that, as per the CAT, non-refoulement cannot be overridden. Although the 
Court was ‘well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern 
times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence’, it held that 
‘even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.32  
The non-derogability of non-refoulement, as set in Chahal, ‘has been followed 
extensively by other international courts and bodies, and now reflects an 
accepted international standard’.33  
 
The non-derogability of non-refoulement is inherent to the Organization of 
African Unity’s Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa (OAU Convention), whereby it ‘does not provide for expulsion 
or refoulement of refugees under any circumstances’.34 Kapferer confirms that 
the OAU Convention does not permit any exceptions to the rule of non-
refoulement. 35  The South African Refugees Act, drawing on the OAU 
Convention, also provides a non-derogable obligation of non-refoulement.36 
 
The burden of proof in refoulement cases and RSD is shared between the 
applicant and the State.37 The Executive Committee (ExCom) clarifies that 
both parties must have access to ‘sufficiently objective and accurate 
information’.38 However, as refugee claimants are unable to access the same 
amount of information as the host state party, such a sharing of burden can 
                                                             
32 Ibid. 79. 
33 Ramzy v. Netherlands, Application no. 25424/05, Council of Europe: European Court of 
Human Rights, 27 May 2008 – Written comments by Amnesty International, The Association 
for the Prevention of Torture, Human Rights Watch, Interrights, The International 
Commission of Jurists, Open Society Initiative and Redress. 
 
34 UNHCR (n 10 above) F.  
35 S Kapferer ‘The interface between extradition and asylum’ UNHCR Department of 
International Protection (2003) 76. 
36 South African Refugees Act (1998) No. 130 of 1998. 
37 Wouters (n 17 above) 94 and Hathaway (n 8 above) 81. 
38 UN High Commissioner for Refugees General Conclusion on International Protection 












seem unjust. 39  Indeed, Duffy claims this burden is at odds with the 
Convention’s inherent principles.40 These concerns are later addressed within 
the proposal of a monitoring network, as the generation of COI from 
grassroots NGOs, fed into an accessible resource, would seek to overcome this 
unbalance.  
The Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) further cover non-refoulement, and will be 
discussed in due course. 
 
 
3. State obligations of non-refoulement in international law 
 
In this section of the paper, two main groups of law will be analysed with 
regards to (a) the standard of risk constituting refoulement and (b) the 
standard of proof required in proving such a risk. This allows analysis of the 
legal potential of information generated by a monitoring network. The first 
‘group’ will include the Convention,41 the OAU Convention and the Refugees 
Act of South Africa (Refugees Act). These are selected due to their direct 
relevance to refugees and the issue of refoulement, and because the Refugees 
Act derives from them.42 Secondly, the ICCPR43 and CAT44 will be analysed. 
The ICCPR and CAT are selected as they are over-arching international 
treaties that are often evoked in arguing against a proposed removal.  States’ 
post-removal obligations, under all above-mentioned bodies of law, will then 
                                                             
39 Wouters (n 17 above) 96. 
40 Duffy (n 12 above) 381. 
41 Article 33 is quoted above. 
42 Refugees Act (n 36 above) Preamble. 
43 UN General Assembly International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , 16 
December 1966, Art. 7: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.’ 
44 UN General Assembly Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 












be explored, and analysed in terms of the monitoring network assisting in 
States’ engagement with such obligations. 
3.1 Standard of risk constituting refoulement and standard of proof  
 
(a) Refugee Convention, OAU Convention and Refugees Act 
The OAU Convention outlines a similar refoulement article to the Convention, 
although more generous in its provisions: 
No person shall be subjected by a Member State to 
measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or 
expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain 
in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty 
would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article I, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 [refugee status].45 
 
‘Rejection at the frontier’ clarifies states’ obligations regarding primae facie 
refugees, which escapes the differing interpretations, discussed above, evoked 
by the Refugee Convention. The ‘reasons’ set out in Article 1 of the OAU 
convention are wider than the Refugee Convention in that they include public 
disorder and external aggression as grounds for refugee status.46  
The Refugees Act’s provision regarding refoulement reads: 
Notwithstanding  any  provision  of  this  Act  or  any  other  
law  to  the  contrary,  no person  may  be  refused  entry  
into  the  Republic,  expelled,  extradited  or  returned  to  
any other  country  or  be  subject  to  any  similar  measure,  
if  as  a  result  of  such  refusal, expulsion,  extradition,  
return  or  other  measure,  such  person  is  compelled  to 
return  to  or  remain  in  a  country  where-  
(a)  he  or  she  may  be  subjected  to  persecution  on  
account  of  his  or  her  race, religion,  nationality,  political  
opinion  or  membership  of  a  particular  social group;  or  
(b)  his  or  her  life,  physical  safety  or  freedom  would  be  
threatened  on  account  of external  aggression,  occupation,  
foreign  domination  or  other  events  seriously disturbing  
                                                                                                                                                                        
State ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture’.  
45 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa 10 September 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45. Art. 2(3). 












or disrupting  public  order  in  either  part  or the  whole  of 
that  country.47 
Again, the provisions are wider than the Convention and seek to clarify 
rejection at the border and removal to third countries. 
The level of persecution, grounds for refugee status and standards of proof 
relating to refoulement within these three bodies of law is now analysed. Such 
analysis permits a full understanding of the standards and risk which a 
monitoring network’s information must adhere to if it is to be used in legal 
cases. It also clarifies whether abuses recorded by a monitoring network 
would constitute refoulement. 
Level of persecution 
Levels of persecution that constitute refoulement in the Convention, the OAU 
Convention and the Refugees Act mirror directly the level of persecution that 
constitutes refugee status. For example, Article 33 of the Convention states 
that if a person faces treatment amounting to persecution as set out in Article 
1 (grounds for refugee status), that person cannot be returned. Weis confirms 
these levels of persecution are the same.48 Indeed, there would exist a logical 
inconsistency within the Convention if they were to be different.49 It is 
important to remember that these legal frameworks protect refugees.50 Those 
that have been denied refugee status (i.e. returnees) are no longer protected 
by these legal frameworks. The implications of this will be discussed in more 
detail below, as CAT and ICCPR can offer such individuals protection.   
The ground for refugee status (and therefore the level of persecution 
constituting refoulement) is a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’, as appears in 
all three legal frameworks. 
 
                                                             
47 Refugees Act (n 36 above) Art. 2. 
48 P Weis The Refugee Convention 1951: the travaux préparatoires (1995) 33. 
49 E Lauterpacht and D Bethlehem ‘The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement’ 
in E Feller and V Türk (eds.) Refugee protection in international law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) 125. 
50 Convention (n 9 above) Preamble and OAU Convention (n 45 above) Preamble and 












Grounds for refugee status: a ‘well-founded fear’ 
A ‘well-founded’ fear is ‘the backbone of the refugee definition as well as the 
prohibition on refoulement’.51 Although fear is a subjective human emotion, a 
‘well-founded fear’ in the Conventions’ context refers to fear with an objective 
basis.52 Indeed, the Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear stress that 
subjective fear not an essential element of deciding upon refugee status, but is 
rather a factor that can be used when there is an ‘insufficiency of actual risk’.53 
In short, such fear must be objectively provable and is not to be taken as fear 
in the sense of trepidation.54 The ‘test’ of a well-founded fear was set in the 
case of Matter of Acosta and has since been referred to as the ‘Acosta test’.55 
Acosta found that a well-founded fear can be proved when the feared conduct 
amounts to persecution (see below), when there is a ‘real chance’ of this 
occurring, and when the persecutor is – or could easily become – aware of the 
applicant’s characteristic that is the basis of his or her persecution.56  
This requires the use of objective evidence and ‘a decision on the relative 
weight to be assigned to different forms of evidence’,57 as corroborated by the 
UNHCR Handbook.58 The Convention is worded to require a forward-looking 
assessment of risk of persecution,59 in that it is not a purely objectively-based 
definition - what Hathaway describes as ‘prospective harm’.60 Thus, the varied 
and correct use of COI in deciding on refoulement is vital. The importance of 
objective evidence in refugee cases highlights the importance of COI garnered 
by a monitoring network. Indeed, by adhering to COI guidelines (which is 
                                                             
51 Wouters (n 17 above) 83. 
52 Ibid. 83. 
53 University of Michigan Law School The Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear (2004) 1. 
These guidelines are not legally enforceable but are used in guiding states RSD. 
54 Ibid. 
55 For example, in the well-known judgement of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421; 107 S. Ct. 1207; 94 L. Ed. 2d 434; 55 U.S.L.W. 4313, United 
States Supreme Court (1987) 40. 
56 Matter of Acosta, A-24159781, United States Board of Immigration Appeals, 1 March 1985, 
2. 
57 Michigan Guidelines (n53 above) 3. 
58 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1992) para.42. 
59 Wouters (n 17 above) 84. 












discussed in more detail below), the monitoring network would seek to collect 
evidence that can be used in on-going asylum cases. Such evidence, used in 
refoulement cases, would therefore seek to ensure, or challenge, state 
adherence to non-refoulement obligations. 
 
Persecution 
Having surveyed other academics’ thoughts on persecution, Hathaway 
concludes persecution to be a ‘sustained or systemic violation of basic human 
rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection.’61 Indeed, the Austrian 
Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation 
(ACCORD) stress in their guidelines that Hathaway’s definition of persecution 
is to be kept in mind when using and gathering COI information.62 The 
definition is used in RSDO decisions in South Africa and is often quoted in 
refusal letters. The definition is used widely in caselaw. For example, the case 
of Horvath v Secretary of State Department which found that persecution 
requires serious harm and failure of state protection, rests its judgement upon 
Hathaway’s definition.63 The New Zealand case Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99l 
also uses Hathaway’s definition and concludes that core norms of 
international human rights law are relied on to define persecution. 64 Such 
‘core norms’ are, according to Hathaway, outlined in the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights (UDHR); the ‘first group’ of such rights (non-derogable) 
include freedom from deprivation of life, torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.65 Freedom from arbitrary detention is also included, although both 
Conventions make provision for this within their non-refoulement articles, 
whereby if liberty would be threatened, refoulement cannot take place. With 
                                                             
61 Ibid. 101. 
62 ACCORD Researching Country of Origin Information: a training manual (2006) 37. 
63 Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, United Kingdom: House of Lords 
(Judicial Committee), 6 July 2000. 
64 Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, 71427/99, New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority, 16 August 2000, 61. 
65 Hathaway (n 23 above) 109-111. Hathaway groups further rights (derogable rights) which, 












regards to the OAU Convention, if ‘events seriously disturbing public order’ 
are likely to be encountered on return, this too engages obligations of non-
refoulement.66 This widens the situations whereby obligations under non-
refoulement can be engaged.  
Under the Refugee Convention, such persecution must be due to one of the 
five Convention grounds in order to evoke non-refoulement protection. Space 
does not permit a full consideration of each ground, although a short 
description of each is relevant to the types of persecution that a monitoring 
network is to document should its COI be relevant to refugee claims. In short, 
the Convention grounds are to be taken as race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.67 Goodwin-Gill 
offers a summarised definition of each, whereby race is to be interpreted as 
‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’68 and religion as ‘theistic, 
non-theistic and atheistic beliefs’. 69 Nationality can be interpreted as 
‘membership of particular ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic 
communities’70 and political opinion as ‘any opinion on any matter in which 
the machinery of the State, government, and policy may be engaged’.71 
Hathaway emphasises that political action need not be taken: if the 
persecutors ‘are, or could reasonably become aware of, the claimant’s views’, 
this can suffice to engage refugee status or protection from non-refoulement.72 
Membership of a particular social group is ‘is impractical, if not impossible’ to 
define.73 This concept is being remoulded to include various categories by 
different caselaw. Canada v Ward offers the most concise definition of ‘social 
group’. The judgement defined social groups as those defined by innate or 
unchangeable character, or whose members voluntarily associate and from 
which they would not leave for sake of their human dignity. Social groups can 
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also be those which are formed voluntarily but unalterable due to historical 
permanence. 74  Mention whether the other Conventions including non-
refoulement obligations require such grounds? 
 
Standard of Proof 
The standard of proof set in establishing a well-founded fear is equal to that of 
the standard evoking non-refoulement. Thus, the standard of proof for evoking 
non-refoulement can be taken directly from the caselaw and academic findings 
on well-founded fear.  
The standard of proof required to evoke non-refoulement is widely considered 
to be one of ‘a reasonable degree’ of persecution on return.75 Lauterpacht 
confirms this to mean ‘more than mere conjecture concerning a threat but less 
than proof to a level of probability or certainty.’76 The UNHCR Handbook finds 
that a well-founded fear exists when such fear of persecution can be proved to 
a reasonable degree.77 Wouters states that the standard of risk has not been 
clarified in independent international legal spheres, but academic research 
has concluded that  
States draw a distinction between the stricter balance of probabilities test and 
the more commonly used reasonable chance or serious possibility test. The 
balance of probabilities test requires the refugee claimant to establish that 
persecution will probably take place, or is reasonably likely or more likely than 
not to occur.78 
Hathaway adds; 
The ‘reasonable possibility’ test is the appropriate compromise between respect 
for the Convention’s commitment to anchor protection decisions in objectively 
observable risk and the need to simultaneously to avoid the establishment of an 
inappropriately high threshold of concern.79 
Although such general standards have been set by States and academics alike, 
and shall be used in this paper as a common general standard of proof, it is 
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important to remember that jurisprudence on the standard of universally 
agreed?. For example INS v Cardoza-Fonseca case found that, instead of a 
balance of probabilities, a ‘reasonable possibility’ test should be applied to 
invocate the Convention.80 Meanwhile, Joseph Adjei v Minister of Employment 
and Immigration found the standard to be ‘a reasonable or even serious 
possibility as opposed to a mere possibility’. 81  Conversely, Canadian 
jurisprudence has been liberal, demanding only a ‘reasonable possibility’ of 
proof.82 
Nonetheless, the standard of ‘reasonable degree’ has generally been upheld in 
caselaw. Indeed, Sivakumaran v Immigration Officer held the standard of ‘a 
reasonable risk’ standard.83 The judge made clear that it was to be proven that 
the appellants faced ‘ reasonable risk that the appellants would meet death or 
serious injury’and that such ‘injury’ was to be taken to mean ‘the sort of 
injurious consequence contemplated in the dictionary definition of 
persecution’, as explored above.84 Sivakurmaran, heard by the UK Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal in 1989, involved five Sri Lankan Tamils who had 
claimed asylum. The judge used ‘Press articles, journals and Amnesty 
International publications and also information supplied...by the Home Office 
and as a result of recent visits to Sri Lanka by Ministers’ to ascertain such 
likelihood.85 From such evidence, it was to be ascertained whether the 
appellants building on the decision of the lower courts’ ‘reasonably likely to 
be subjected to inhuman treatment’ level.86  
 
(b) CAT and ICCPR 
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Protection against refoulement offered by ICCPR and CAT is wider than the 
above-mentioned Conventions in that they do not require that an individual is 
persecuted on Convention grounds. Furthermore, what constitutes 
refoulement within the ICCPR and CAT is wider than that of the Convention.  
CAT states that: 
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.87 
 
When ‘determining whether there are such grounds...a consistent pattern of 
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights’ should be proven by the 
‘competent authorities’.88 
The UNHCR advises that the ICCPR encompasses the obligation not to 
‘extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by Articles 6 [right to life] and 7 
[right to be free from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or  punishment].89 The UN Human Rights Committee has also confirmed the 
ICCPR’s direct applicability to refoulement cases.90  
 The non-derogability of non-refoulement within CAT and the ICCPR ensure 
this wide protection is absolute.91 These wide-reaching obligations, and the 
post-removal obligations within the ICCPR and CAT, make them important 
bodies of law when exploring the legal feasibility of monitoring refoulement. 
As abovementioned, the CAT prohibits return where torture might occur. The 
CAT defines torture as ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
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physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person’. 92 Under the ICCPR, 
Article 7 states that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’93  
In terms of standard of proof, the Committe Against Torture (ComAt) confirms 
that ‘substantial grounds’ must be provided in order to prevent return.94 
Chahal v UK exemplifies the use of this standard. The case involved an order 
for the deportation to India of a Sikh separatist for national security reasons. 
According to the Court, there were ‘substantial grounds’ to believe that there 
existed a ‘real risk’ of CAT Article 3 being violated on the appellant’s return.95  
 
As echoes the wording of Article 3 of the CAT, such persecution must form 
part of a ‘consistent pattern of gross and systematic violation of fundamental 
human rights’ to evoke refoulement.96 This standard has been confirmed in 
caselaw97 including ComAT cases. ComAT points out that the personal risk of 
Article 3 violations must be proved.98 (Under the OAU Convention, however, 
refugee status applies to those fleeing due to ‘events seriously disturbing 
public order’99 and proof of personal risk is not required.) 
 
3.2 Use of COI in non-refoulement cases 
As this paper establishes, a standard of risk must be proven, at a certain 
standard of proof, in order to evoke non-refoulement. Such standards 
must be reached through the use of objective evidence, ‘taking into 
account all relevant information, including new or previously 
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unrecognised facts’.100 It is of great interest to establish what has led 
courts to decide to halt – or continue – removals of failed asylum 
seekers. These cases exemplify the uses of standard of risk and proof. 
Importantly, such cases exemplify what kind of objective evidence 
suffices to halt a removal. From this, one can deduce what kind of 
objective evidence can assist in proving cases of refoulement. This is one 
of the central aims of the monitoring network itself. Section 5.5 of this 
paper seeks to analytically compare two such cases in order to deduce 
such standards of proof and their implications for the monitoring 
network. 
 
3.3 States’ obligations post-removal 
(a) Refugee Convention/OAU Convention/Refugees Act 
As abovementioned, these legal frameworks do not protect failed asylum 
seekers. Accordingly, there are no obligations on States once a person has 
been removed.101 However, as explored below, ICCPR and CAT can create 
post-removal obligations for the host state. Indeed, Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem argue that  
the responsibility of the Contracting State for its own conduct and that of those 
acting under its umbrella is not limited to conduct occurring within its 
territory.102 
The authors go on to argue that a State’s extra-territorial responsibility 
regarding refoulement is engaged under Article 2(1) of the ICCPR which 
covers all individuals subject to States’ jurisdiction.103 Loizidou v Turkey,104 
which used CAT to prove post-removal State obligations, evaluated State 
responsibility regarding Turkish troops’ behaviour outside of Turkey. The 
Court held that  
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according to established caselaw...the Court has held that the extradition or 
expulsion of a person by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under 
Article 3 [of the CAT], and hence engage the responsibility of  that State under 
the Convention.105 
Wouters goes on to recommend a State obligation to monitor the application 
of Article 33 of the Convention.106 He further claims that ‘not having any 
responsibility would de facto nullify effective protection from refoulement’.107  
Indeed, the only cases of post-return monitoring that the UNHCR implement 
are those of diplomatic assured returns. 108  Furthermore, post-removal 
monitoring would ensure the Convention is being applied in ‘good faith’109 as 
it will adhere to the ‘relevant rules of international law’110 – as set out in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties - that is, to ensure the realisation of 
human rights.111  
 
A state can ensure its adherence to non-refoulement not only through post-
returns monitoring, but through ensuring a ‘proper and complete’ RSD.112 
Refoulement in an ‘absence of a review of individual circumstances [is] 
inconsistent with the prohibition of refoulement’, and should be appealable.113 
For example, in the South African case of Tantoush v RAB, the judge 
condemned the Refugee Status Determination Officer’s (RSDO) lack of 
reference to COI, and the fact that the Refugee Appeal Board did not address 
it, linking it to the appellants’ proposed removal and, in the judge’s eyes, the 
appellant’s refoulement.114 He stressed that ‘objective facts must be used to 
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decide if a well-founded fear exists’.115 Such rulings inherently claim that 
unfounded and inadequate RSD decisions are, fundamentally, a form of 
refoulement through the states non-adherence to the obligation of proper RSD 
procedures. Although the State’s obligation to conduct full and fair RSD 
procedures using COI does not explicitly exist within the Convention, it is 
clear that States are obliged to implement treaties in good faith,116 and 
therefore it can be argued that inadequate RSD procedures would violate 
States’ treaty obligations. 
 
Following the above logic, if unjust RSD procedures are challenged in court 
(through appeals), so should those cases whereby the failed asylum seeker 
has been returned following inadequate RSD procedures. Such cases have 
only been approached by ComAT and the HRC, as discussed in the following 
section. In the case of Ahani v Canada, for example, the counsel of the claimant 
was unable to contact him after his removal.117 This instigated the case and 
the HRC ruled that reparation be arranged should it be found that Ahani faced 
torture. The state was also asked to ‘take such steps as may be appropriate’ to 
ensure he would not be subject to torture in the future.118 One assumes that 
‘such steps’ would include the granting of refugee status.  In light of such 
cases, the obligations of the Refugee Convention are re-engaged, despite 
refugee status initially being denied in by the host state. 
Linked to the point of the re-engagement of the Refugee Convention is the fact 
that many returnees, despite not having valid claims to refugee status, are 
persecuted when returned due to their imputed political opinion. For example, 
leaving Eritrea and applying for asylum elsewhere is considered by the 
authorities as an act of treason, and carries punishments of torture and 
imprisonment.119  
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These points serve to illustrate the fact that Refugee Convention obligations 
that can be re-evoked, after removal. The monitoring network would seek to 
instigate this and would follow Wouter’s recommendation above that Article 
33 of the Refugee Convention should be more closely monitored. The 
information generated by the monitoring network could provide evidence in 
post-removal legal cases. If refoulement is proved in such cases, the State will 
be obliged to adhere accordingly through protection of the applicant,120 and to 
improve future adherence to this legal obligation. 
(b) CAT and ICCPR  
The ICCPR and CAT create explicit post-return State obligations, in that their 
provisions for redress cover those individuals who have been removed from 
the host state. The HRC and ComAT are respectively attached to these legal 
frameworks, and have both addressed post-return refoulement. Article 2(3) of 
the ICCPR and Article 14 of the CAT provides redress and fair and adequate 
compensation for victims of torture, which Wouters interprets to include 
victims of torture on removal to another State.121 
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR reads: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when 
granted.122 
Article 14 of CAT reads: 
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of 
torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate 
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compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the 
event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependants 
shall be entitled to compensation. 
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to 
compensation which may exist under national law.123 
 
ComAT stresses that a State’s obligation to prevent acts of torture is ‘wide-
ranging’ and the Wouters confirms that the HRC has on several occasions 
concluded that, should a State commit refoulement, that State should make 
appropriate compensation and guarantees of non-repetition. 124  Indeed, 
ComAT stress in a General Comment that the ‘comprehensive reparative 
concept...entails restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition and refers to the full scope of measures required 
to redress violations under the Convention [Against Torture].’125 ComAT goes 
on to demand that ‘States parties should undertake measures to combat 
impunity for violations of the Convention’, and ensure guarantees of non-
repetition. 126  Ensuring compliance with Article 3 of the Convention 
prohibiting refoulement’ is noted as one such measure.127 For example, the 
Court found this in the case of Ahani v Canada.128 In the case of Brada v France, 
the fact that the Algerian asylum seeker (already removed to Algeria) ‘had not 
exhausted domestic remedies’ prior to removal instigated the case .129  ComAT 
questioned ‘whether refoulement of the complainant to another State violated 
France's obligations under the Convention [Against Torture]; in other words 
whether, when the French authorities decided to enforce the deportation 
order they could reasonably think, in the light of the information available to 
them, that Mr. Brada would be exposed to substantial danger if sent home’.130  
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ComAT found that the conditions the appellant were returned to were in 
breach of Article 3 of CAT.131 (Furthermore, the appellant had lodged an 
appeal and ComAT had demanded France halt the removal in the interim until 
their decision.132) demanded that they be informed of his whereabouts and 
that he be adequately compensated.133 Thus, he provisions and obligations 
under CAT and ICCPR can be invoked post-removal. It must, however, be kept 
in mind that ComAT decisions are not legally binding on States, but offer legal 
guidance and recommendations.  Indeed, ComAT can ‘submit observations’134 
to State Parties which, although non-binding, are considered authoritative 
interpretations of international law.135 
 
3.4 Conclusions: State’s responsibilities regarding refoulement 
In conclusion, one can see that the type and level of persecution addressed by 
ICCPR and CAT is much wider than that of the Conventions.  
According to the Sivakurmaran judgement, the ‘kernel’ of the appeal was the 
question, ‘is there a risk that the persecution will be for a Convention 
reason?’136 This clarifies the type of persecution that needs to be proved to 
engage a state in non-refoulement obligations under the Convention. In short, 
such persecution must be on Convention grounds. As this paper explored, 
definitions of persecution under ICCPR and CAT are much wider and do not 
require persecution on particular grounds. Signatory States bound to the 
Refugee Convention, ICCPR and CAT are obliged to the coexisting obligations 
surrounding non-refoulement. As this thesis has explored, the resulting 
obligations on States are wide, encompassing a generous definition of what 
constitutes refoulement. 
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4. Why a monitoring network is required 
This section seeks to set out the main reasons behind the need for a 
monitoring system. 
A failed asylum seeker who is returned to his or her country of origin is likely 
to encounter security agents upon their arrival. Depending on the country, 
security checks might be undertaken. In some states, automatic detention and 
interrogation face all failed asylum seekers. A returnee might face torture, 
indefinite detention, or be ‘disappeared’.  
The reality that faces returnees will be examined more closely in this section 
through two case studies. Firstly, Congo DRC serves as an example of a state to 
which many failed asylum seekers are sent. Research on the fate of such 
returnees, from what information is available, exemplifies the need for a 
monitoring network in such countries. The research also indicates the gaps of 
knowledge and clarity surrounding returnees’ fate. The second case study is of 
a failed asylum seeker who underwent a removal. Both case studies are 
anecdotal, but this provides contextual and ‘real-life’ information, thus 
enhancing the concept of a monitoring network.  
This section of the paper will then study the ongoing phenomena that 
contribute to the need of a monitoring network. The concept and practise of 
deportation and removals is studied before the occurrences of increasing 
removals, accelerated RSD and the designation of ‘safe countries’ are 
examined, amongst others, as contributing to the call for a monitoring 
network. 
4.1 Deportation and removals 
Deportation and the removal of ‘unwanted migrants’,138 according to Gibney, 
‘has been considered a secondary instrument of migration control...resorted 
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to relatively rarely and with a degree of trepidation’.139 It is what he describes 
as a ‘cruel power’ that uproots individuals and disbands families and 
communities.140 Indeed, considering that there exists a large gap, in liberal 
states, between the number of people who are theoretically ‘deportable’ and 
the number of people who are actually deported, removals can be seen as very 
much a symbolic power rather than one of practical value in terms of 
controlling migration.141 Despite States being bound to several international 
legal obligations regarding human rights, as explored above, deportations and 
removals are rising – and within this rise, a higher occurrence of refoulement 
is highly likely. Hollifield finds the opening of international economies and the 
tightening of immigration controls (with the rise in deportations) 
contradictory.142 Gibney adds that a rise in States’ use of deportations reflects 
‘a new willingness and ability on the part of states to treat non-citizens in 
illiberal ways’.143 Although some States have compiled COI that can be used 
for RSD procedures and deportation cases,144 there is no State-run monitoring 
institution for those failed asylum seekers that have been removed. 
 
4.2 Case study I: receiving state – Congo DRC 
This section focuses on Congo DRC as a case-study, exemplifying the fate some 
returnees face. It is within such contexts that a monitoring network can be 
imagined. 
The case of Congo DRC is particularly relevant to the proposal of a monitoring 
network. The country is plagued by conflict and thousands of people seek 
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asylum from Congo DRC every year. States including the UK and South Africa 
regularly return failed asylum seekers to Congo DRC, and journalists and 
academics have voiced concern over this, especially concerning returning 
people to Congo DRC after the 2011 election.   
Procedures facing returnees in Congo DRC 
The procedure facing returnees in Congo DRC, without a monitoring network 
in place, can only be discerned from existing reports and interviews. It seems, 
in theory, most returnees face a reasonably standard procedure upon 
disembarkation in Congo DRC, which has been corroborated by several 
sources, both in news articles145 and in COI.146 On their arrival to N’Djili 
Airport, returnees will be screened and interrogated by Direction Générale 
des Migrations (‘DGM’) officials. If they are found to be on a ‘wanted’ list, they 
will be transferred to prison or a detention centre.147 Depending on their 
perceived danger to the Congolese stat , these detainees will face 
interrogation, torture, prolonged detention or disappearance. Some are able 
to bribe their way out.148 
In reality, this procedure is applied inconsistently: Unsafe Return reports that 
some returnees were handed to Congolese immigration officers, whilst others 
were handed to Congolese police.149 It has emerged that, during recent 
returns to Lubumbashi, Congolese officials transferred returnees directly to 
prisons or screened them at the prison itself.150  Some returnees do not face 
difficulty in the airport itself but rather are subject to the state security 
afterwards,151 which a particularly efficient force in targeting potential 
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opponents is152 and which has a ‘very good and wide network throughout the 
country’.153 With regards to surveillance of opponents, the state is ‘extremely 
efficient’.154 Trefon confirmed the state security’s bugging of SIM cards as an 
acknowledged form of surveillance, which was corroborated by Unsafe 
Return. 155  A 2008 report by Human Rights Watch further confirms 
government agents’ use of text messages, anonymous calls and night visits as 
methods of intimidation.156  
The fact that returned asylum seeker are, simply for having applied for asylum 
in another state, considered political threats in DRC is corroborated by 
various other sources.157 The Evening Gazette reported on a returnee who 
‘was told he was arrested because he was from the UK, against the regime and 
had to be punished’.158 Dianne Taylor, in her article for the UK-based Guardian 
refers to the presidential candidate Marie Thérèse Nlandu, who had herself 
been imprisoned in the DRC.159 In 2007, she made a speech at the All Party 
Parliamentary Group at Great Lakes, explaining that Congolese abroad (in this 
case, Britain) are viewed as traitors.160 The Congolese media also plays into 
the imputed political opinions of returnees. Vircoloun described 
how 'expulsions have been described by the state media as politically 
motivated'.161 The national television broadcaster, Radio Télévision Nationale 
Congolaise (‘RTNC’), portrayed the return of Congolese deportees from South 
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Africa in early March as ‘combatants’.162 Segatti,163 writing from Kinshasa, 
confirmed that such broadcasts are reinforcing the idea that Combatants are 
thugs that ought to be eradicated (terms used in that video)’.164 These terms 
used to describe Congolese failed asylum seekers put them at further risk of 
being targeted by the Congolese State and, perhaps, Congolese society.  
 
Existing Reports on Returnees in DRC 
Several reports have sought to follow Congolese returnees. The most 
prominent report is Unsafe Return, complied by the UK-based NGO Justice 
First, which has received attention both within media and judicial spheres.165 
The UK Country of Origin Information Service (COIS), which published their 
latest report on Congo DRC in March 2012, quotes Unsafe Return at length. 
COIS is used in RSD procedures and in subsequent court cases, and therefore 
has been accepted as legally admissible evidence.166  
The report found that 13 out of 24 Congolese returnees were ‘subject to some 
degree of interrogation, arrest, imprisonment, verbal, physical and sexual 
abuse, rape and torture’;167 six out of nine deported children were also 
imprisoned.168 Three of these children required medical treatment following 
their imprisonment.169 Seven out of ten Justice First clients who had been 
retuned were imprisoned without access to a lawyer. Two out of the five 
women interviewed were raped on their return.170 
Several journalists have also sought to research the fate of Congolese 
returnees. Jenny Cuffe, writing for the BBC, reports on returnees facing 
torture and detention in jail. Her interview with the National Intelligence 
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Official (of the ‘ANR’, or Congolese secret police) exposes how ‘political 
dissidents, people who leave the country and go to say bad things about the 
government’ face detention. When asked what would happen to them, the 
ANR official only answers, ‘everything’.171 Cuffe contacted Celestin Nikiana, a 
human rights lawyer in the DRC, who had found returnees in Kin Mazière – an 
infamous prison in Kinshasa – who had ‘been there for more than five years 
without charge’.172 The US Department of State 2010 human rights report on 
Congo DRC found that prison conditions in the country ‘remained severe and 
life-threatening’.173 
 
Dianne Taylor, reporting for The Guardian (UK), exposes the torture faced by 
two returnees, who were detained in Kin Mazière prison. This included 
beating, burning and forced sexual acts. Furthermore, her report found 
‘entries in the Kin Mazière log book, leaked to the Guardian, [which] confirm 
the men's [returnees’] detention there’174.  
 
Niren Tolsi, writing for The Mail and Guardian (South Africa) reports that, of a 
South African deportation to DRC in February 2012, 46 out of 52 returnees 
were detained at Kasapa prison. Here, they were ‘deprived of food and water, 
threatened, beaten and interrogated about their political affiliations’.175  
 
However, quite opposed to Unsafe Return and other mentioned reports, a 
2006 UNHCR report found that Congolese returnees they faced no real harm 
on return. 176  The report refers to the International Organisation for 
Migration’s office in Kinshasa, who claimed to have no information regarding 
the mistreatment of returnees,177 although it acknowledged conditions in 
detention centres (to which returnees are transferred) as 
                                                             
171 Cuffe (n 145 above). 
172 Cuffe (n 145 above). 
173 US Department of State 2010 human rights report: Democratic Republic of the Congo (2011) 
10. 
174 Taylor (n 157 above). 
175 Tolsi (n 165 above). 
176 UNHCR Response to Information Request – DRC: Treatment of rejected asylum seekers 
(2006) 1.  












‘dire’. 178   L'Association Africaine de Défense des Droits de l'Homme 179 
(ASADOH) and Voix Sans Voix180 (VSV), two NGOs working in Congo DRC, 
feature in the UNHCR report as recording no mistreatment of refused asylum 
seekers.181  
However, recent contact with the abovementioned organisation provides 
conflicting information. The ASADOH Katanga president confirms his belief 
that returnees are being detained in prisons and disappearances being 
commonplace.182 The VSV was recently found to no longer have offices at 
N’Dijili airport due to restricted resources, thus their ability to comment on 
the treatment of returnees is somewhat affected.183 The suspicious death of 
Floribert Chebeya, VSV president, in 2010, has led many returnees to fear 
being involved with, or revealing information about, the VSV.184 In a phone 
interview in 2010, Mr Chebeya stated that returnees were imprisoned.185 This 
is contrary to VSV’s position in the UK Country of Origin Information report. 
Furthermore, information from VSV regarding returnees has been used in 
2012 COI reports, despite their offices at the airport being closed since 
2010.186 
The ASADHO president further confirmed that there have been several arrests 
of Congolese returnees from South Africa. There were 45 returnees who 
landed at the Loano airport in Lubumbashi in early 2012. They were taken 
directly to the Kasapa prison.187 
Comité des Observateurs des droits de l’Homme (CODHO) found, in February 
2011, that returnees’ fates are at the discretion of the DGM official. If a 
returnee presents a ‘problem’, in that they are known for their position 
against the state, they will be ‘exposed to ill-treatments when arriving in Ndjili 
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[airport]’.188 Make clear how this treatment of returnees would violate the 
legal non-refoulement obligations laid out above. 
 
The worrying differences in evidence regarding Congolese returnees is of 
deep concern. It is especially important that the monitoring network should 
be made up of several organisations in order to allow the corroboration of 
information. The fact that the UNHCR have a very different opinion to several 
other sources is something that should be addressed through a monitoring 
network. (This is addressed in more depth in the section, below, ‘Existing 
COI’.) 
Furthermore it is interesting to note the resourcefulness which both 
journalists and Justice First deployed in gathering their evidence. Whereas the 
UNHCR report gathered information from other organisations such as the IOM 
and VSV, further research indicates that such organisations may not be so 




4.3 Case study II –  the returned failed asylum seeker  
 
Examples of the fate of returned failed asylum seekers are plentiful, but 
anecdotal. Although the case studies are indicative of the situation facing 
returnees, their anecdotal nature restricts the legal implications of such 
situations. A fully functioning monitoring network would be able to collect the 
data of many such individuals, thus lending weight to otherwise anecdotal 
examples. The collection of a large amount of this data would, if it adhered to 
official COI guidelines, be legally admissible. The legal admissibility of 
information gathered by the monitoring network is dicussed in greater depth 
at Section  
 
The following case study comes from the Fahamu Refugee Programme: 
                                                             












In 2006, a Sudanese refugee reported what happened to him after being 
deported. This Sudanese had spent eight years in the Netherlands. His claim to 
asylum had been rejected but he was allowed to stay in the Netherlands and 
work. When the Dutch government decided to deport large numbers of failed 
asylum seekers, he was arrested and, accompanied by three policemen, deported 
to Sudan. At the Khartoum airport he was handed over to Sudanese state 
security, who tortured and imprisoned him. It took nearly a year for his family to 
find him, bribe the prison officials and secure him a new identity and passport in 
order for him to escape to Egypt. This was necessary because he was still in fear 
of persecution from the Sudanese state. As he put it, ‘I am 34 years old and all I 
want is to be safe’.189 
Such case studies remain anecdotal and, between the NGOs and refugee 
organisations working across the world, such cases are not wholly 
unusual. Such an individual would, if the monitoring network was fully 
functional, be monitored upon his return.  
 
 
4.4 States’ conduct: why a monitoring network is required  
(a) Failed asylum seekers as ‘treasonous’  
As the DRC example proves above, a major factor contributing to the need of a 
monitoring network is the fact that returnees face charges of treason upon 
their return. Several states view the very act of applying for asylum in another 
state as treason, and punish it as such. An Amnesty International report on 
Eritrea found that ‘under torture, or threat of torture, returnees have been 
forced to state that they have committed treason by falsely claiming 
persecution in asylum applications. Leaving the country is itself considered by 
the authorities as an act of treason’.190 In other states, simply crossing the 
borders of other states is an act of treason; in Sudan, visiting Israel is viewed 
as treason, ‘a crime punishable by long-term imprisonment or death’.191 Such 
treatment is in violation of the provisions of CAT. The noted torture of Eritrea 
would be in violation of CAT, Article 2. Prison conditions in Sudan are, 
according to the US State Department Human Rights Report, ‘harsh and 
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overcrowded’, where healthcare and food are scarce and ‘sanitary and 
medical facilities [are] uniformly inadequate.’  192  Many prisoners were found 
to be permanently shackled around trees outside.193 Such conditions do not 
fulfil the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,194 and 
such conditions could be claimed to violate basic human rights including the 
CAT provision against ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment ‘.195 Last, the 
abovementioned punishment of death violates the ICCPR right to life.196  
Such evidence should be taken into consideration by States that intend to 
deport asylum seekers from these States. The accusations made against failed 
asylum seekers on their return indicates the further need to monitor returned 
failed asylum seekers, as their wellbeing is endangered upon return. If such 
evidence is gathered by the monitoring network, and used in legal cases 
against removing states, one hopes that state policies would alter to avoid 
such situations as outlined above, and to ensure their better adherence to 
legal obligations of non-refoulement. 
(b) Rise in Deportations 
There has been a marked rise in the use of deportations as a method of 
immigration control.197 Gibney refers to this as the ‘deportation turn’.198 This 
rise unavoidably result  in more failed asylum seekers, and more individuals 
with refugee claims, being returned. Indeed, Hathaway claims that, through 
this, the principle of non-refoulement has been ‘undeniably under increasing 
attack in state practise’.199  
This rise in deportations is largely due to the politicisation of the removal 
system. Indeed, Tony Blair is quoted as celebrating his ‘government’s 
achievement’ in dramatically increasing deportations as part of a campaign to 
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‘prevent fraudulent asylum seekers misusing the asylum route to gain 
entrance to the British labour market’.200 The European Council on Refugees 
and Exiles (ECRE) also comments that ‘European governments have used 
return as a tool to gain political advantage by appearing tough on asylum at 
the expense of fairness and efficiency’.201 Such politicisation in removing 
individuals risks a hasty, inadequate removal procedure, as the system is 
geared towards reaching targets (as seen in the US, for example)202 rather 
than removing individuals whose refugee claims have been thoroughly 
analysed before being refused.  
It is inevitable that a rise in removals of any kind results in a rise in the return 
of failed asylum seekers, thus heightening the need of their monitoring. The 
monitoring network would gather information indicating in which areas 
returnees are facing human rights abuses on return. Such information can be 
used in legal cases or used as a political lobbying tool to bring about change in 
the deportation systems, ensuring better screening of those facing 
deportation and removal. 
 
(c) Inadequate RSD Procedures & ‘Safe Countries’ 
Hathaway refers to a ‘less direct form’ of refoulement, which is ‘namely by 
application of an xcessively restrictive interpretation of the Convention 
definition, leading to the rejection of genuine refugees who may face 
persecution on their return’.203 The UNHCR has also expressed its concern at 
‘accelerated’ RSD procedures and ‘manifestly-unfounded claims’ where appeal 
rights are limited.204 Under-resourced or overly-strict asylum systems have 
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permitted further refoulement.205 A similar phenomenon exists in States 
designating certain countries of origin as ‘safe’. This results in more people 
with genuine asylum claims facing return.206 Designation of ‘safe countries’ in 
the UK, includes Ghana, Nigeria, Ecuador and Albania. Asylum applicants from 
these countries face a different asylum procedure (Detained Fast Track, or 
DFT) and lessened appeal rights.207 DFT is an accelerated asylum procedure 
applied to those whose cases, according to the UK Border Agency, can be 
decided ‘quickly’.  The asylum applicant is detained for the whole process, and 
most detainees ‘only have an opportunity to consult their duty solicitor in a 
short conversation over the phone’208.  
The designation of ‘safe countries’ is particularly relevant to the monitoring 
network, as evidence generated by the network might prove on-going human 
rights abuses to returnees. Indeed, the UNHCR records that 20, 361 
individuals, originating from Ghana (a ‘safe country’), are recognised 
refugees.209 Evidence regarding the treatment of returnees to ‘safe countries’ 
could be used, through legal avenues, to better improve the UK’s policy of 
designating safe zones, which inevitably allow the  
The above mentioned factors contributing to a rise in deportations outline an 
international system of removal within which genuine refugees face a rising 
risk of return. Indeed, as ECRE’s paper points out, using return ‘as a tool to 
gain political advantage [and] appearing tough on asylum [is] at the expense 
of fairness a d efficiency.’210 As such, the need for a monitoring system is 
further highlighted. However, this needs to be in tandem with the 
improvement of RSD procedures and the implementation of rights to appeal 
and fair trials. 
 
(d) Alternative programmes encouraging return 
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Voluntary Returns Programmes, carried out by IOM, UNHCR and several 
implementing partners, offer reintegration support for those migrants and 
asylum seekers who chose to return to their country of origin. The offer of 
return is made ‘tempting’211 and reports have found that many of these 
returns are far from ‘voluntary’.212 Rather, a situation is created whereby 
return is their only choice. Denial of benefits and removal of accommodation 
are measures that the Home Office use to persuade refused asylum seekers to 
apply for ‘voluntary’ return. Far from a ‘voluntary’ return, such measures 
force failed asylum seekers to ‘accept the option because they do not have any 
other choice’.213 Indeed, the Institute for Race Relations reports that, of 
twenty-nine Sri Lankans who opted for Voluntary Return, ‘nearly all twenty-
nine Tamils...suffered racial harassment from police or other officials since 
their return, and four had suffered serious human rights abuses’.214 States’ use 
of Assisted Voluntary Return Programmes, and its misuse (as above noted) 
resulting in individuals being returned, sometimes coercively, to dangerous 
situations, is another factor in modern State practise that highlights the need 
for these returnees’ monitoring. 
 
(e) Securitisation of asylum 
In the climate of global terrorism, the securitisation of asylum and the 
ensuring rise in removals in the name of ‘national security’ has permitted 
states’ wider abilities in returning failed asylum seekers. This is what 
Hathaway has called a ‘zealous exploitation of national security exemptions’ 
which can result in refoulement.215  This rise is dangerous in that those with 
genuine refugee claims are more likely to be caught up in such scenarios and 
returned to their country of origin. 
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For example, explicitly in light of the London terrorist attacks in 2005,216 the 
UK published Exclusion of Individuals from the United Kingdom for Engaging in 
Unacceptable Behaviour.217 After acknowledging that non-nationals can be 
excluded from the UK on the grounds of public good, the document then lists 
the types of behaviour which would be regarded as unacceptable and which 
could constitute the grounds for their deportation. Such behaviour includes 
speaking or publishing of information with the intent to foment, glorify or 
encourage serious criminal activity or terrorist violence. Furthermore, this list 
is indicative, not exhaustive.218  
In the US, ‘Secure Communities’ is a government initiative that allows local 
law enforcers to take fingerprints of those taken into custody and check their 
data against the Automated Biometric Identification System. When a match is 
detected, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement decides if they are 
deportable or not.219 Critics claim that this policy results in the situation 
whereby ‘individuals can be deported for shoplifting, jumping subway 
turnstiles, drunken driving and petty drug crimes’.220 This process of arrest 
and removal is conducted whilst detainees are in custody, and access to legal 
assistance is reduced.221 This policy has allegedly resulted in hundreds of 
Cambodian refugees being returned.222 In South Africa, after recent anti-
Kabila protests in Johannesburg were filmed, 150 Congolese participants were 
arrested. Tolsi reports that ‘the arrests made came after the team’s 
investigations which included examining footage of several incidents of this 
nature’’. 223  Linked to the securitisation of removal and asylum is the 
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extrajudicial transfer of suspected terrorists to third States where they may 
be detained or interrogated (‘extrajudicial rendition’). In terms of asylum 
cases, Ahmed Hasan Agiza and Muhammad Al-Zery exemplify how those with 
refugee claims can become caught up in extraordinary rendition and face 
refoulement. They both applied for asylum in 2001 in Sweden. The US 
requested extraordinary rendition and Sweden permitted their removal to 
Egypt where they were allegedly detained and tortured.224 The monitoring 
network could seek to uncover such cases and use such information to prove 
that those refugees facing extrajudicial rendition are subject to refoulement. 
Such information could be used to rule on such cases and prevent refoulement. 
Although expulsion is permitted on the grounds of national security, as per 
the Refugee Convention,225 analysts and academics are concerned at States’ 
increasingly liberal use of such provisions.226 Courts have sought to limit such 
state practise in cases which involve appellants faced with removal under the 
expulsion clause. For example, the ECHR confirmed, in the case of Maslov v 
Austria, that the ‘power of expulsion must be exercised in good faith’ by 
States.227 Other cases have sought to define further the strict grounds on 
which an individual can be removed under this clause.228 A monitoring 
network could assist in gathering information regarding those removed under 
this clause. If refoulement was proved to have occurred, this would add weight 
to the Courts’ ruling that States must exercise good faith in such cases in order 
to avoid refoulement. 
 
(f) Mass expulsions resulting in failed asylum seekers being returned 
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Mass expulsions of foreigners, including asylum seekers, is another form of 
removal that risks resulting in the return of genuine asylum seekers.  
Hathaway makes a distinction between the cases of refoulement in developed 
and less-developed states in that restrictive asylum policies in some states 
cause refoulement, whilst mass expulsions often take place in less developed 
states. 229 He continues; ‘particularly in Africa, the expulsion of refugees is also 
linked to fear that their presence will embroil the host state in armed conflict, 
or retaliatory attack’.230  
Such mass expulsions are, in some ways, easier to monitor, in that larger 
NGOs and human rights organisations are more able to document larger 
groups of returnees, and due to the number of people involved, such removals 
are likely to gain media attention.  
(g) Lack of Existing Support for Returnees 
 
In addition to the factors contributing to a need for a monitoring network is 
the fact that very few organisations exist that work with, or have within their 
remit, returnees. The lack of support that returnees face on return further 
calls for institutions to be involved in their monitoring and support.  
 
 As mentioned, organisations like IOM and Refugee Action monitor those who 
return with Voluntary Return Programmes, but returnees who have had their 
asylum claim refused find themselves with very little or no support on their 
return. The UNHCR monitors returnees but only within the remit of ‘durable 
solutions’ – such returnees would be those who have returned voluntarily or 
who are being supported in their reintegration by UNHCR programmes.232 
IOM has developed community-based monitoring systems to develop better 
understanding of situations facing returnees233.  
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A small amount of recorded organisations offer support specifically to 
returned failed asylum seekers. The Association des Refoulés d'Afrique 
Centrale au Mali (ARACEM)234 provides welfare support, including housing 
and orientation, to those who have been deported to Mali. Other organisations 
offer support to deportees: these include returned immigrants, deportees, and 
failed asylum seekers. Most of these organisations are in post-conflict 
countries, and there seems to be few in the main current refugee-producing 
states. For example, the Returnee Integration Support Centre, based in 
Cambodia, offers support to those deported from the US. They assist with 
documentation, employment, housing and referrals235. Bienvenidos Seas, in 
the Dominican Republic aids returnees in documentation, employment and 
financial assistance236. Alternative Chance is specifically for ‘Haitian criminal 
deportees’, and offers job counselling and orientation services.237 In short, 
although support networks exist, there seems to be no organisation with the 
specific remit of monitoring and supporting returned failed asylum seekers. 
Some organisations have attempted to monitor returned failed asylum 
seekers. The Association Nationale d'Assistance aux Frontières pour les 
Étrangers (Anafé), a network of organisations providing assistance to 
foreigners, attempts to maintain contact with those who are removed 
including migrants and asylum seekers.238 Anafé has a presence at airports in 
France where repr sentatives hand contact cards and information to those 
facing deportation.239 Voix Sans Voix, of the Congo DRC, monitored and 
offered support to returnees in the past, but has ended this service due to 
financial difficulties.240 CIMRADE241 held a roundtable in 2003 with the aim of 
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a ‘better understanding of the violations and difficulties faced by migrants and 
the needs of the organisations working with deportees’.242 
 
The fact that there are few organisations offering support to returnees 
strengthens the call for a monitoring network, which would seek to bring 
together existing organisations and increase the capacities of other 
organisations working in Countries of Origin to monitor deportees. 
Furthermore, the monitoring network can gather, from these existing 





4.5 Recent developments in COI  
Recent developments in COI creation have challenged States’ return policies. 
Such reports have used innovative forms of technology and have exploited 
new abilities of tracking and researching the fate of returnees. Such 
developments hold promise for the prospect of a monitoring network. 
Unsafe Return 243  was compiled following concerns by the authoring 
organisation, Justice First, that Congolese returnees had ‘disappeared’. The 
author sought to contact returnees and travelled to the DRC to conduct 
research and interviews. The methodology is explained at length including the 
attempts to legally verify information gathered in the DRC.244 This report has 
been used in cases both in the UK245 and in appeals submitted recently in 
South Africa.246 The report has been published as part of the UK Country of 
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Origin Information Service,247 thus giving it the ‘seal of approval’ to be used in 
court and confirming the its legal admissibility.  
Deported to Danger is a similar report: 40 returnee interviews took place in 
eleven countries.249 The methodology used conformed to the criteria used by 
the Refugee Review Tribunal in assessing credibility.250 A recent documentary 
was crafted by an Afghani returnee documenting his post-removal experience 
with a camcorder he was given in the UK.251 David Corlett’s book Following 
Them Home: The Fate of the Returned Asylum Seekers252 seeks to track several 
failed asylum seekers who were returned from Australia. Corlett, having 
completed his doctoral thesis on Australia’s response to asylum seekers, 
concluded that ‘what was missing was in-depth, informed research on the 
situation of those people who were being pressured to return from Australia 
and on the fate of those who had been returned’.253 
There are many similar reports and newspaper articles that have followed 
returnees to their country of origin.254 Organisations and blogs dedicated to 
this area have unearthed further information. 255  In April 2010, Anafé 
published a report documenting the experience of deported migrants, entitled 
‘On the Other Side of the Border: Monitoring of ‘Refouled’ People’.256 Many of 
those documented in the report had asylum claims. Although the report is 
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anecdotal in nature, it attempts to gather statistics257 and points to wider 
abuses that exist for many returnees upon return.258  
 
 4.6 Criticism of existing COI  
UNHCR is, of course, a ‘reputable source, if not the best available 
source...which must be given due weight’.259 However, even reputable sources 
can come under criticism as has been noted in caselaw.260 In their COI 
guidelines, the Country Guidance Working Group (COI-CG)261 stresses that 
judges should know of such criticisms.262 Whilst researching the treatment of 
Congolese returnees, 263  conflicting information arose. Personal 
communication with journalists and NGOs generated opposing information to 
that of the UNHCR.264 Perhaps the criticism of UNHCR’s COI comes at a time of 
increased politicisation of the organisation and there is a need, therefore, for 
refugees to be claimants of their own rights,265 through their direct generation 
of COI information.  
 
5 The monitoring network: a proposal 
 
In light of the above, this thesis proposes the monitoring of failed asylum 
seekers in the form of a monitoring network. Following the proposal, the 
network’s adherence to COI guidelines is addressed before dealing with 
potential difficulties such a network might face.  
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FRP’s proposal of such a project is as follows: 
 
We aim to establish a network that can be used by organisations and individuals 
to monitor and save failed asylum seekers....We hope to list individuals or 
organisations from each country of origin that could be alerted by an 
organisation in the deporting country when a failed asylum seeker is being 
deported to danger.266 
 
As Matthews points out, a monitoring network would seek, overall, to ‘take 
deportations out of their secrecy’267 and to ensure State adherence to the 
principle of non-refoulement.  Organisations in countries of origin would 
ideally meet returnees as they arrive. If this is not possible, attempts to 
monitor and document the wellbeing of returnees should be made. The 
emerging information should be corroborated as much as possible and can be 
fed into a publically-accessible database.  If returnees are ‘disappeared’ on 
return at least it is documented. Such disappearances have instigated legal 
cases in the past.268 Indeed, it was a newspaper report that instigated the case 
that suspended removals to Zimbabwe in 2007.269 This indicated the potential 
of the legal admissibility of such information.270  
As a result of the rising concern for returnees’ wellbeing, several 
organisations and academics have recommended that a form of monitoring be 
established.271 Indeed, drawing on the views of 74 NGOs, ECRE formulated a 
report regarding the voluntary repatriation and mandatory return of those 
with refugee or asylum seeking status, in which the establishment of a 
monitoring network is recommended.272 ECRE advises that the UNHCR, 
embassies and NGOs monitor returnees in tandem, and share such 
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information with each other and with host states.273 The report recommends 
that ‘NGOs should work co-operatively together to ensure that the wide range 
of skills and expertise required in this complex field are co-ordinated 
efficiently and to develop standards of good practice’.274 Such monitoring 
procedures should establish complaints mechanisms, data collection 
mechanism for gathering statistics, and systems for returning information to 
the host country.275  
ECRE’s recommendation of a monitoring network is much wider than that of 
this paper: it suggests different organisations perform different tasks, 
including providing welfare, integration projects, family tracing and 
reunification, and so other such services.276 Whilst such aspects of return 
should indeed be provided for, this paper concerns itself with the monitoring 
of the wellbeing of returnees. The author feels that offering welfare and other 
services within the monitoring network would put the network in danger of 
being over-burdened and would detract from the main aims of the network.  
Thus, the aims of the monitoring network would fall into two main categories. 
On one hand, the information gathered from the monitoring network, in being 
relayed back to the host states, can assist in improving the quality of 
adherence to non-refoulement principles. This aspect of the network is also 
noted in ECRE’s report.277 This will be achieved through the instigation of 
legal cases, and depends on such the network’s information being legally 
admissible. The monitoring network’s research methods will therefore have 
to conform with COI standards in order to ensure its admissibility (see the 
following section). By contributing to existing COI, the monitoring network 
seeks to better inform the RSD procedures in place in host states, ensuring a 
fairer RSD system. This, one hopes, will result in those individuals requiring 
protection being granted it. The monitoring network, through bringing 
together organisations around the world and through collating information 
                                                             
273 Ibid. 21. 
274 Ibid. 














regarding the fate of returnees, will form an international monitor of the 
deportation and returns system. This, one hopes, will put pressure on States 
to take further action in avoiding refoulement.  
 
Secondly, and more immediately, the monitoring network will seek to protect 
and monitor those who are returned to their countries of origin. 
Organisations, refugee community groups, churches, NGOs and other 
members of the monitoring network will, if the returnee so wishes, be alerted 
to their return. The presence of an organisation representative at the airport 
can assist in ensuring the returnees’ safety, avoiding detention, and can, assist 
the returnees’ reintegration to their host state, through the organisation itself 
or by referring them to other relevant local organisations. If the returnee is 
detained upon arrival, the representative is, at least, aware of the detention. 
Those involved in the monitoring network will be informed and the relevant 
organisation in the host state may instigate a legal enquiry into the case. 
 
5.1 The monitoring network’s adherence to existing COI guidelines & 
the legal admissibility of the monitoring network’s information.  
This section seeks to analyse the ways in which the information gathered by 
the monitoring network can adhere to existing COI Guidelines. This analysis 
therefore seeks to understand the legal admissibility of the information 
gathered by the monitoring network. 
Firstly, both the asylum claimant and the State must use,279 and be able to 
access,280 objective COI in deciding upon, or defending, asylum claims. 
Guidance in the production and use of COI can be garnered from sources such 
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as UNHCR,281 ACCORD282 and the International Association of Refugee Law 
Judges (IARLJ).283 Furthermore, academics have approached the topic.284  
The COI-CG sets out nine criteria which COI must adhere to in order to be 
legally admissible. ACCORD corroborates such guidelines285 as does the 
Immigration Advisory Service.286  
Firstly, COI must be directly relevant to the facts of the asylum case287 and 
relevant issues must be adequately covered.288 The UNHCR confirms that COI 
must be both case and country specific.289  As a monitoring network would 
gather information from the experiences of failed asylum seekers, many of 
whom would have similar claims to those applying for asylum in host states, 
such information would indeed be directly relevant to others in a similar 
position, which is a valid contribution to RSD.290  
Secondly, COI must be temporally relevant. Most UNHCR and State generated 
COI are produced annually or bi-annually.291 Also, COI should be based on 
publically available and accessible sources.292 As the monitoring network 
would be a ‘on-the-ground’ network, that can constantly be contributed to by 
human rights organisations that have face-to-face contact with failed asylum 
seekers, its temporal relevance will be ensured. Open-access to such 
information is therefore vital – an easily accessible website, such as FRP, may 
suffice. 
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The COI-CG Guidelines further suggest that COI material must be satisfactorily 
sourced: corroboration, multi-sourced reports with accessible sources are 
recommended. 293  Furthermore, COI should been prepared using sound 
methodology.294 Information generated by a monitoring network would be 
qualitative as it would be constituted by several individual returnees’ 
accounts. This form of COI is recognised as it can be ‘highly indicative of the 
real situation’.295 If the information can be subject to verification by larger 
human rights organisations or relevant embassies,296 this will further allow 
such COI to conform to legal standards. Verification by other organisations 
will ensure the source will have been checked ‘insofar as it is possible to do 
so’,297 as per COI-CG. This also allows the monitoring network’s adherence to 
the next COI-CG guideline, which is the independent monitoring of such 
information.298 It is recognised that anonymous evidence may be relied upon 
‘where this is necessary to protect the safety of witnesses and the asylum-
seekers’.299 If anonymous information could also be verified whilst protecting 
the returnee’s identity, this would permit for more sound information. 
The final COI-CG guidelines are that COI should be balanced300 and 
should be subject to judicial scrutiny by other national courts.301 Courts’ 
and States’ scrutiny of such information within relevant cases ensures 
that COI that is used adheres to such requirements.302  This was 
confirmed in the case of NA v UK, which also used the COI-CG principles 
to guide its judgement.303 
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Information gathered by the monitoring network must adhere to the 
above COI guidelines in order to ensure legal admissibility. The 
information’s use in national courts will be widely encouraged as a 
means of verification and – ultimately – an improvement in State returns 
policies. 
5.2 Case Comparison: evidence use in refoulement cases 
 
To further understand the standards of legally admissible COI, this section 
shall concentrate on two UK cases, BK v SSHD and SM and Others, in a 
comparative analysis. Both cases were heard in the same year and, whilst one 
orders the halting of deportations, the other permits their continuation. This 
section seeks to analyse the standards of risk used, the standards of treatment 
that constitute refoulement and, most importantly, the use of COI within the 
cases. Alongside COI Guidelines (as discussed in Section 5.1), a thorough 
analysis of these cases allows a fuller understanding of what COI can be used, 
and what policy changes it could contribute to. Both these cases were heard in 
the Asylum Immigration Tribunal, which (as the COI Guidelines below outline) 
caselaw has  confirmed as a judicial entity in which the use of COI serves to 
confirm its judicial admissibility.305 
Introductory Information  
BK v SSHD is a detailed, lengthy306 case that concerned a Congolese asylum 
seeker who faced return to DRC, which was to be implemented by the UK 
State. It was heard before a senior immigration judge. The case focused on the 
risk facing all Congolese returnees and whether such returnees were at ‘real 
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risk of persecution or serious harm or ill treatment’.307 The case took place in 
camera, as the court was concerned for the witnesses’ safety should their 
identities become known. 308  The court heard from several witnesses, 
organisations and country experts. The court concluded that removals to 
Congo DRC could continue. 
SM and Others is a much shorter case. The case concerned three appellants, all 
of whom were Zimbabweans appealing their impending removal. The judge 
sought to question whether Zanu-PF members and war veterans would face 
risk on return and whether internal relocation was a viable option for those at 
risk in their home area.309 The Court heard evidence from one expert witness 
and media articles. The court ruled that ‘there is a reasonable degree of 
likelihood that this will include treatment sufficiently serious to amount to 
persecution’.310 
 
Standard of risk 
BK confirmed the test as a risk of ill treatment, amounting to a consistent 
pattern, as per a “generally or consistently happening” test.311 SM confirmed 
that it was to prove a ‘real risk of persecution’.312 
 
Witnesses 
BK v SSHD heard three witnesses, who are referred to as W1, W2 and W3. 
Through their work in the Congo DRC, they had met each other or knew of 
each other.313 W1 was a refugee from the Congo DRC who worked as a 
principal assistant to the chief prosecutor of the Military Court in the DRC.314 
W2 and W3 were refused asylum seekers, who both worked in the airport 
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that receives returnees. 315  One witness had documented proof of this 
employment.316  Torture and rape were claimed to be ‘commonplace’ by W1, 
as was the transfer of returnees to Kin Maziere prison in Kinshasa.317 W2 
further claimed that failed asylum seekers were ‘perceived as traitors and 
criminals’.318 W3 confirmed that returnees in Congo DRC were maltreated and 
left in ‘appalling’ conditions of detention.319  
All three witnesses were found to be unreliable. This was due to several 
factors, including that fact that W1 and the expert were at odds regarding the 
frequency of human rights violations against returnees. 320 The fact that there 
are inconsistencies in the witnesses’ asylum claims also detracted from their 
credibility.321 Dates provided were inconsistent. The Court disbelieved the 
witnesses’ role as airport immigration personnel, although it was accepted 
that W2 held the role of Immigration Officer at N’Djili airport. 322 However, 
W2’s asylum claim had been rejected as it was found to be inconsistent. He 
was therefore not found to be a credible witness.323 The fact that he was an 
absconder from the UK Immigration Authorities also detracted from his 
credibility.324 Inconsistencies regarding how many returnees are freed from 
detention was also claimed to detract from W3’s credibility.325 
The case of SM and Others did not use witnesses as evidence.  
One can see the stringent requirements of the Court when individuals seek to 
provide evidence. It is interesting to note that inconsistencies in their asylum 
claims automatically invalidate their ability to provide evidence (not 
necessarily connected to their asylum claim). Whilst this can be 
understandable, it does not take into consideration UNCHR’s recommendation 
that inconsistencies should be considered in light of the wider context at hand 
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and that untrue statements are not a reason for refusal alone.326 This point is 
especially relevant to the monitoring network if it hopes to use evidence 
provided by failed asylum seekers, as States can claim that their refused 
refugee claim is proof of their invalidity as witnesses. However, if an external 
organisation is to report on the fate of returnees, and can triangulate and 
corroborate such information whilst adhering to COI Guidelines, such 
evidence could be legally admissible. The legal admissibility of such 
information can be explored further in the two cases’ treatment of COI, expert 
witnesses and organisations’ inputs, below. 
 
Media Journalists 
The fourth witness to give evidence in BK v SSHD was Jenny Cuffe, author of a 
BBC World investigation into the treatment of Congolese.327 Cuffe travelled to 
Congo DRC where she interviewed several failed asylum seekers who had 
been returned,328 who recounted maltreatment.  Although found to be an 
‘impressive witness’, the court found that Cuffe ‘had not sought to ask a 
number of questions pertinent to any scientific or properly empirical 
investigation of the issue.’329 Cuffe did not ask for identification of those she 
interviewed and based her interviews on trust only, and therefore the 
screening of interviewees was found by the court to be insufficiently 
‘rigorous’.330 The lack of ‘hard evidence’ in her reporting further detracted 
from her role as witness, and the court lamented that ‘it is a great shame that 
a more scientific study has not been done’.331 
Thus, one imagines that if Cuffe had ensured more sound methodological 
approaches, her evidence would have been legally admissible. It seems that 
adherence to the COI Guidelines would suffice in such information gathering, 
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and this must be adhered to if the monitoring network is to be legally 
admissible. 
Unlike BK v SSHD, SM and Others accept two articles (news reports from The 
Observer, UK, and the Herald, Zimbabwe) as credible evidence.332 Although 
The Observer article ‘was not sufficient to suggest that all returnees were at 
risk’333 as it documented a single case of detention, its source or methodology 
was not questioned at all. The Herald article was noted as being corroborated 
by another paper, The Sunday Mail, but, again, there was no analysis of 
methodology or information sources in the judgement.334 
 
The inconsistency between the two cases regarding the sources of media 
information is interesting; especially considering that the latter case caused a 
major policy change (i.e. the halting of deportations to Zimbabwe). It seems 
that the SM and Others case did not revert to the requirements set out by the 
COI Guidelines but assumed the sources as credible. The monitoring network 
should seek to ensure that, while the information they receive is credible, that 
it can be triangulated as much as possible with other forms of media. 
 
Representatives of Organisations 
BK v SSHD heard vidence from individuals who had attempted to trace 
Congolese returnees by phone. Elizabeth Atherton, founder of the Congo 
Support Project,335 traced returnees and took the accounts of 14 returnees, 
several of whom were ‘detained and ill-treated’.336 DW was the chairman of 
Lazarus Refugee Concern, a voluntary organisation set up especially for failed 
asylum seekers.337He was able to monitor four people, with three of them 
being monitored at N’Djili airport, all of whom were detained.338 While the 
court found Asherton to be ‘sincere’, her findings were based on trust rather 
                                                             
332 SM v SSHD (n 309 above) 16. 
333 Ibid. para.33. 
334 Ibid. para. 16. 
335 BK v SSHD (n 302) 76. 
336 Ibid. para. 78. 
337 Ibid. para. 81. 












than seeking to validate and corroborate the information at hand.339 A similar 
justification for discounting DW’s evidence was confirmed by the court.340 The 
finding of BK v SSHD has ramifications for the monitoring network, as the 
thorough methodology behind information gathering is ensured.   
The case of SM and Others did not refer to representatives of organisations in 
its case. 
Experts 
BK v SSHD heard evidence from an expert (who remained anonymous), whom 
the court found to be credible. 341 E1 claimed that ‘human rights violations are 
seen as widespread’342 and that returned failed asylum seekers are in danger 
of human rights violations.343Nevertheless, a change of opinion in his reports, 
over time, led the court to doubt his credibility.344 This stringent approach 
sets very high standards for the provision of evidence in court cases regarding 
issues relevant to the monitoring network. This standard seems unusually 
high, especially when one considers the expert used in the case of SM and 
Others. Professor Ranger, an expert on Zimbabwe, was asked to give evidence 
relating to several ‘risk categories’ regarding returnees in Zimbabwe. His 
expertise is proven by 45 years of familiarity with Zimbabwe, teaching at 
university in Harare and other universities of note.345He is often in Zimbabwe 
and ‘has known Robert Mugabe and other senior leaders of ZANU-PF for 45 
years’.346 The court accepted the evidence of Ranger as ‘his expertise and 
knowledge of Zimbabwe is clear’.347 This was despite the fact ‘much of the 
information he had collated was speculative but this was inevitable as he was 
being asked to deal with very recent events.’348 
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Ranger describes how, since 2002, the risks to returnees had increased. He 
used an anecdotal story of one returnee who managed to escape detention in 
Zimbabwe.349 Ranger also conducts a review of the media’s treatment of 
returnees.350 Ranger provides details on the layout of Harare airport and the 
possibilities of interrogation rooms.351 This further corroborated his close 
knowledge of Zimbabwe and the treatment of returnees.   
Thus, despite speculation and anecdotal evidence, Ranger is accepted as a 
credible witness, whilst E1 of BK v SSHD is discrediting for shifting opinions 
over the years of publications. This seems inconsistent in the standards set. 
Nevertheless, the monitoring network could triangulate and corroborate 
information gathered regarding the treatment of returnees by asking experts 
to attend cases. In fact, FRP already run a similar programme:352 the careful 
selection and use of such experts must ensue if their evidence is to be legally 
admissible, as the findings of BK v SSHD prove.  
 
COI 
The court in BK v SSHD found certain evidence to be credible that supported 
the claim that many of those Congolese claiming asylum are in fact economic 
migrants.353 A 2006 EU report on illegal migration, which found most 
migration from DRC to be economically driven,354 UNHCR position statements 
which found asylum seekers were not at risk,355 and individual embassy and 
EU government assessments, were all found to be credible sources.356  
When regarding COI, the court in SM and Others uses COI provided by the UK 
Border Agency (CIPU).357 This  finds that there were ‘flagrant breaches of 
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human rights sanctioned by the government’.358 The Court accepted news 
reports (which are consistent with other evidence) emanating from 
Zimbabwe that returnees would be subject to interrogation.359 Thus, well-
used COI sources (UNHCR, government COI) is acceptable in both cases. The 
COI created by the monitoring network will have to be to such a standard that 
it reaches the standards of such COI. The fact that Unsafe Return has been 
included in the UK Border Agency’s CIPU (which SM and Others found to be 
legally admissible) is proof that well-researched evidence, however 
contradictorily to a State’s position, can suffice the standards of legally 
admissible COI. 
 
5.3 Harnessing modern technology for human rights  
 
On a more conceptual level, information generated by individuals in a bottom-
up approach is increasingly accepted as a form of holding states to account. 
Jeff Handmaker approaches the abilities of civil society to hold governments 
to account, with regard to refugee matters in South Africa.360 He notes that 
since Ignatieff’s so-called ‘human rights revolution’, the international legal 
sphere has nurtured the ability for ‘participation-based human rights’.361 
Accompanying these developments within the civil-legal nexus is the 
advancement – and legal potential – of media technology. As mentioned in the 
introduction, recent technological advances have allowed for the popular 
generation and use of information. The role of social media networks in recent 
political uprising and change is widely documented.362  Several clients at the 
LRC mention internet footage that documents post-return treatment. The 
legal admissibility? of such information in terms of COI is an exciting and 
interesting area that merits real research, especially in terms of adherence to 
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the abovementioned COI Guidelines. Difficulties in verifying such information 
will have to be addressed. Nevertheless, it holds within it a great potential for 
uncovering and exploring the realities post-returns. 
 
5.4 Potential difficulties in implementing a monitoring network  
Such a monitoring network will undoubtedly encounter several logistical, 
ethical and moral challenges. This section seeks to imagine – and counter – 
such challenges.  
Firstly, as abovementioned, the qualitative and anecdotal nature of the 
information created by a monitoring network may invalidate its legal 
admissibility. However, through corroboration and large volumes of research, 
such hurdles can be overcome. The logistical and moral hurdles perhaps pose 
a greater challenge. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise 
Arbour pointed out, monitoring returnees cannot assure torture or death will 
not occur; and a returnee is ‘unlikely to reveal his ill-treatment if he is to 
remain under the control of his tormentors’. 363 Participating organisation will 
have to prove their credibility and trustworthiness, especially if they are to 
have contact with returnees.364 
Organisations involved in monitoring returnees risk accusations of 
collaboration with returnees themselves and might face similar treatment. 
Access to returnees might be limited or prohibited. Furthermore, such 
monitoring requires resources, which many NGOs simply do not have. These 
issues will have to be addressed if a monitoring network is to be set-up; 
safeguards and funding will have to be put in place, both of which are 
challenging to acquire.  
Finally, on a purely theoretical level, if one envisages a fully functioning 
monitoring network, the legal implications could be tremendous. If the 
occurrence of refoulement faced by returnees is proved to be widespread, 
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States would have to reconsider return policies. This would have huge 
implications for the existing ‘removal systems’ that States currently 
implement.  
6 Conclusion and Current Developments 
 
The fate of returned failed asylum seekers remains a little understood and 
little researched aspect of forced migration. Indeed, most existing knowledge 
is generated by organisations and individuals who offer anecdotal case 
studies. Recently, attention has focused on the treatment of returnees and 
reports are emerging that paint a worrying picture. Indeed, Unsafe Return 
records high levels of detention and rape upon failed asylum seekers’ 
return.365 Deported to Danger and Following Them Home present similar 
pictures of interrogation and torture.366 This thesis has sought to understand 
the feasibility of a monitoring network which would monitor such returnees.  
As non-refoulement is a ‘cornerstone’ of refugee law, and as it has been held as 
international customary law,367 ensuring full adherence to this obligation 
should be enforced. This thesis has explored the wide state obligations 
stemming from the principle of non-refoulement: as per the Convention, 
beneficiaries include ‘every individual having a well-founded fear of 
persecution’, whether they have refugee status or not.368  
tate obligations of non-refoulement are evoked if the treatment of returnees 
reaches a certain standard. The Convention sets this at the same standard of 
treatment that evokes refugee protection. Therefore such treatment must also 
be due to one or more of the five grounds constituting refugee status: race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion.369 Such treatment has been set, by academics and caselaw alike, as a 
‘sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a 
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366 Deported to Danger (n 249 above) and Corlett (n 252 above). 
367 UNHCR (n 11 above). 
368 Goodwin-Gill (n 13 above) 2. 












failure of state protection.’370 CAT and ICCPR protect every human being, 
regardless of their refugee status. The obligations of non-refoulement are 
wider within these treaties. CAT outlines that, if there exist ‘substantial 
grounds’ for believing that a returnee would be ‘in danger of being subjected 
to torture’,371 the State is obliged to refrain from returning the individual. 
Furthermore, treatment that constitutes ‘torture’, as per CAT, is much wider 
than that of the Convention, including ‘any act by which severe pain or 
suffering’ might occur.372 The ICCPR obliges states to refrain from refoulement 
if there is ‘a real risk of irreparable harm’ contemplated by the right to life and 
the right to be free from torture other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.373 Thus, one can see that, in theory, the failed asylum seeker is 
protected by several pieces of international human rights law. However, as 
this thesis has outlined, refoulement continues. 
This thesis aligns with academics such as Wouters and Lauterpacht who argue 
that State responsibilities of non-refoulement should be monitored after an 
individual has been removed to ensure a State’s adherence to this 
obligation. 374  The CAT and ICCPR explicitly require post-return State 
obligations in their redress provisions.375 Indeed, this thesis has mentioned 
several cases which involved returnees in which appropriate compensation 
for the returnee was demanded.376 In light of this, it is argued that a 
monitoring network can assist in ensuring State’s post-removal obligations as 
per CAT and ICCPR by monitoring the treatment of the returnees that have 
been removing from the host State.  
Aside from post-removal monitoring as part of fulfilling an international legal 
obligation, this thesis also explored ongoing situations facing returnees upon 
their return. The DRC, in particular, formed a case study outlining the 
treatment of returned failed asylum seekers. Recent phenomena has added 
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weight to the argument that a monitoring network should be put in place: a 
marked rise in deportations, including the removal of failed asylum seekers, 
concurrently results in a rise of the number of returnees risking maltreatment 
on return.377 Inadequate RSD procedures in host states and ‘new’ techniques 
within States’ asylum systems (such as the designation of ‘safe countries’) 
further rise the risk of failed asylum seekers being denied refugee status and 
being returned to danger. The ‘securitisation’ of asylum has also resulted in a 
rise of hasty removals, thus risking the refoulement.378 
Such phenomena are only worsened for failed returned asylum seekers when 
the lack of existing support upon their return is considered. Very few 
recorded organisations offer support to returnees.  
Thus this thesis proposes a ‘monitoring network’, comprised of several 
participating organisations in countries of origin. Such organisations would be 
notified of a returnee who is being returned to his or her country of origin. 
That organisation would then ensure the returnee is met upon arrival and that 
his or her situation is monitored. This information can be collected and, while 
adhering as closely as possible to COPI Guidelines, as this thesis has explored, 
the monitoring network would seek to form a resource of legally admissible 
COI. In conclusion, this paper is of the belief that a monitoring network is 
required if justice is to be realised for returnees. Instances of refoulement 
cannot remain anecdotal cases for which legal practitioners are struggling to 
find justice. Such cases – and the organisations involved – need to come 
together, and crystallise such efforts into a formal, legally-recognised 
network.  This paper ends with the words of Harrell-Bond, whose efforts have 
put into motion this paper’s concepts: 
Now we have only anecdotal evidence to show that deportees have been 
detained, imprisoned and tortured. By systematically gathering information, 
governments that deported failed asylum seekers will become aware of these 
realities. This will help on-going asylum claims, and, ultimately, shape fairer 
asylum policies.379 
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